We introduce a collective action model of institutional innovation. This model, based on converging perspectives from the technology innovation management and social movements literature, views institutional change as a dialectical process in which partisan actors espousing conflicting views confront each other and engage in political behaviors to create and change institutions. The model represents an important complement to existing models of institutional change. We discuss how these models together account for various stages and cycles of institutional change.
discusses the sit-ins, boycotts, voter registration drives, court actions, and other tactics used during the Civil Rights Movement between 1955 and 1965 to push for desegregation and equal rights. He observes that, at first, the movement was composed of many black colleges, black churches, and local chapters of the NAACP, each undertaking localized protest activities. These groups gave rise to more formal and well-known groups, such as the organizations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. These more formal organizations served as a communications network for the movement and attracted external support from labor, northern students, organized religion, and liberal organizations, such as the ACLU. The vast array of networked actors that made up the Civil Rights Movement succeeded in bringing about many institutional changes, including better enforcement of the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education ruling, which required the desegregation of schools; the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which barred unequal application of voter registration requirements, outlawed discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and created the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission; and the passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing. Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy (2002) document Sun Microsystem's efforts to establish its Java product as a technological standard for the industry between 1995 and 2000. Java is software that enables computers to run applications distributed over a network; it "exemplifies the distributed computing paradigm " (2002: 199) that Sun established to break away from Unix and to challenge the dominance of Microsoft's Windows technological design. Sun attempted to create momentum and gain legitimacy for Java by allowing software developers to download it for free, emphasizing its "write-once, runanywhere" features, making it easy to learn, and promoting its potential to become a complete networking platform. The company built a coalition of systems assemblers, software firms, and computer manufacturers, and it entered into agreements with over 150 licensees by the end of 1997. Sun sought to obtain legitimacy for Java by gaining recognition from two international standards bodies: the International Organization for Standards and the European Computer Manufacturers' Association. In seeking to establish Java as a standard, Sun ran into stiff resistance from Microsoft, which had first decided to ignore Java, then made efforts to discredit it, and then eventually licensed it but extended it by developing its own proprietary applications. Further, coalition members accused Sun of biasing the Java development process to serve itself rather than the interests of technology users as a whole. Sun also faced a competing effort, led by Hewlett Packard, to establish an alternative industry-wide standard. Garud et al. conclude that "it remains to be seen whether Sun manages to walk the fine line between opening up and controlling its Java technology " (2002: 206) .
These seemingly unrelated accounts of the Civil Rights Movement and Java technology standard actually share much in common. In each case a few individuals or groups envisioned the need for some form of institutional change to address a problem or opportunity and then initiated actions consistent with their intentions. However, these entrepreneurs did not have the resources, power, or legitimacy to produce institutional change by themselves. They therefore engaged in a "grassroots" form of organizing networks to build their coalition, and they allied themselves with other activists and groups with complementary interests and resources. Groups with opposing views did the same. As a result, many diverse and partisan actors became engaged and embedded in pathdependent processes involving numerous events over an extended period of time. In each case institutional innovations developed through a political process in which actors contributed to a larger solution by recombining inherited practices, technologies, and institutions to address their own unique and partisan interests. In both cases the leaders of the movements displayed political savvy in understanding the interests of the other players in the network, as well as the ability to frame the change agenda in ways that appealed to the interests and identities of these other actors.
The overall process of change in both cases reflects the working of a dialectical model in which a synthesis of new institutional policies and structures emerges from conflict and contestation among colliding groups espousing opposing theses and antitheses. Although the cases do not show this, the syntheses produced by dialectical processes seldom turn out to be what institutional entrepreneurs initially anticipate or desire, and they are rarely if ever the end of the process of change. Dialectical change processes tend to be cyclical and recurrent; with time, the synthesis becomes the thesis for a new cycle of dialectical institutional innovation and change.
The similarities shared by the Civil Rights Movement and the Java technology standard are not limited to these cases; they are common to many social movements and technological innovations. Several scholars have noted the similarities between the processes of technological innovation and social movements (Campbell, 2002; Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Dowell, Swaminathan, & Wade, 2002; Schoonhoven & Romanelli, 2001) . Although the technology innovation management (TIM) literature and the social movement (SM) literature have historically evolved independently, scholars in the two fields are reaching strikingly similar conclusions about processes of institutional innovation.
In this paper we review convergent developments in the study of institutional innovation and change in the SM and TIM literature. We identify similarities and differences in depictions of institutional change among SM and TIM scholars, and we reveal some of the valueadded contributions that each field makes to understanding processes of institutional change. The major contribution of this convergent scholarship is the development of a collective action model for explaining institutional innovation-a model that explains change as emerging from a dialectical process in which opposing actors in the organizational field frame issues and construct networks in an attempt to introduce new institutional arrangements.
We think that the collective action model is an important addition that complements the existing repertoire of models of change in the institutional literature. Organizational institutional scholars have extensively examined how organizations adapt and conform to institutional environmental pressures in order to achieve legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001) . They have also examined the diffusion of institutions among organizations in a population through an evolutionary process of variation, selection, and retention of institutions, typically organizational practices and forms (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997) . Further, they have begun to describe the intentional efforts of institutional entrepreneurs to affect institutional change (Garud et al., 2002; Rao, 1998; Rao, Mo-nin, & Durand, 2003) . Yet, although they have provided a good understanding of how institutional arrangements are adopted and diffused, they have been relatively silent about institutional innovation, or the generative process of collective action through which institutions are created. In the discussion section of this paper, we describe how the collective action model fills an important gap that is not addressed by existing models of institutional design, adaptation, and diffusion. Moreover, we explore how interactions among these models may explain various stages and cycles in the temporal duration of an institution. We end the paper with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the institutional research agenda.
BACKGROUND DEFINITIONS AND MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE Definitions
Institutions are the humanly devised schemas, norms, and regulations that enable and constrain the behavior of social actors and make social life predictable and meaningful (North, 1990; Scott, 2001 ). Following Hurwicz (1993) , we distinguish institutional actors (or entities) from institutional arrangements, with the term institution referring to the latter. This distinction is useful for understanding the institutional and legal bases of organizations. It is only by virtue of an institutional arrangement that an organization can act as though it is a person with specifically designated rights and duties.
Part of the difficulty in understanding institutions is their pervasiveness and diversity. An institutional arrangement may be very simple (e.g., a stoplight or school bell) or complex and highly contested (e.g., stem cell human cloning, environmental laws, or auditing and consulting practices of accounting firms). While institutionalists normally describe institutions as governing action in organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Morrill & Owen-Smith, 2002; , institutional arrangements actually may apply to a single institutional actor (e.g., a firm's internal hiring and promotion policies), to an industry or population (e.g., technology standards, rules of market competition, or a particular organizational form), to all citizens of a country (e.g., taxation, property rights, or civil liberties), or to people in multiple countries (e.g., human rights laws, tariff and trade agreements, international environmental treaties, or foreign currency values).
Our focus is on the process of institutional change, rather than institutional theory per se. We define institutional change as a difference in form, quality, or state over time in an institution. Change in an institutional arrangement can be determined by observing the arrangement at two or more points in time on a set of dimensions (e.g., frames, norms, or rules) and then calculating the differences over time in these dimensions. If there is a noticeable difference, we can say that the institution has changed. If the change is a novel or unprecedented departure from the past, then it represents an institutional innovation.
Much of the literature on institutional change focuses on the nature of this difference, how it was produced, and its consequences. Addressing the question of how institutions are created and change requires a process theory that explains the temporal order and sequence of events based on a story or historical narrative (Abbott, 1988; Pentland, 1999; Poole, Van de Ven, Dooley, & Holmes, 2000) . This explanation should identify the generative mechanisms that cause observed events to happen and the particular circumstances or contingencies behind these causal mechanisms (Harre & Madden, 1975; Tsoukas, 1989) .
Existing Models of Institutional Change
In an earlier review of the literature on institutional change, we (Van de Ven & Hargrave, 2004) identified four distinct models of institutional change, which we labeled the institutional design, institutional adaptation, institutional diffusion, and collective action models. A brief review of the first three models provides a useful background for introducing and extending the collective action model of institutional innovation that will be the focus of this paper. Each model provides an internally consistent account of institutional change but addresses different questions or aspects of institutional change and relies on a different generating mechanism to explain change. The four process models of institutional change are summarized in Table 1. The institutional design model focuses on the intentional behaviors of an individual entrepreneur engaged in the creation or revision of an institution to achieve his or her goals. The generative mechanism for addressing questions of how institutions are designed is teleology. It locates the generative mechanism of change in the purposeful strategic action of individual actors. In this view, institutional arrangements reflect the pursuit of conscious choices and behavior within the bounds that society judges to be prudent and reasonable.
The institutional adaptation model explains how and why organizations conform to forces in the institutional environment. Relying on the metaphor of organic growth, scholars use a lifecycle generative mechanism to prescribe how change unfolds in programmed or regulated directions. Scott (2001) notes that, since Meyer and Rowan's (1977) seminal work, organizational sociologists have focused their attention on the issue of how the institutional environment shapes organizational structure. Proponents of the adaptation perspective view institutional environmental pressures as the mechanism that shapes the structure and actions of organizational actors.
The institutional diffusion model focuses on how and why specific institutional arrangements are adopted (selected) and diffused (retained) among institutional actors in a population. Density-dependence arguments of population ecologists have been used to explain the legitimacy and competitive selection of certain institutional forms (Carroll & Hannan, 1989) . These arguments rely on an evolutionary process, where change is driven by competition for scarce environmental resources among entities inhabiting a population. The collective action model, which we develop further below, examines the construction of new institutions through the political behaviors of many actors who play diverse and partisan roles in the organizational field or network that emerges around a social movement or technical innovation. Scholars working from this perspective are primarily concerned with how new institutional arrangements emerge from interactions among interdependent partisan agents. This perspective relies on a dialectical theory of change, where confrontations emerge between conflicting entities espousing opposing theses and antitheses that collide to produce a synthesis, which in time becomes the thesis for the next cycle of a dialectical progression of change.
In our earlier work (Van de Ven & Hargrave, 2004) , we noted that the collective action model is emerging primarily in the SM and TIM literature and is the least developed of the four models of institutional change. Here we review these bodies of literature with the goal of identifying how novel institutional arrangements emerge to address a social problem or develop and commercialize a new technology. Collective action provides a new model of institutional innovation that supplements and extends existing models of institutional change reviewed in our earlier work. We show that the model both complements and extends existing models of institutional design, adaptation, and diffusion. Finally, we develop recommendations for an agenda of research on institutional change. We note that while institutional scholars have begun to account for conflict, power, and politics in their explanations of institutional change, the implications of these concepts for understanding institutional change require further attention.
COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE SM AND TIM LITERATURE
SM scholars have focused on collective political processes of institutional change that remedy perceived social and ecological problems, barriers, or injustices. Rucht defines a social movement as "an action system comprised of mobilized networks of individuals, groups and organizations which, based on a shared collective identity, attempt to achieve or prevent social change, predominantly by means of collective protest " (1999: 207) . McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) point out that SM scholars are converging on three broad sets of factors to explain the emergence and development of social movements: (1) mobilizing structures, which are the networks of actors, organizations, and resources that are available to insurgents to mobilize and engage in collective action; (2) political opportunity structures, which are the institutional arrangements or political conditions confronting the movement; and (3) framing processes, which are the processes by which social movement actors and incumbents strategically contest the meanings of social issues and events. SM scholars began to focus on resource mobilization and political opportunities in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the then-prevailing view that social movements were irrational and based in emotional release. Bate, Bevan, and Robert (2004) note that attention to framing emerged in the 1990s, when "New Social Movements" researchers began to view social movements as cultural constructions situated within broader societal systems of meaning.
TIM scholars have taken a more proprietary and economic view than SM researchers, examining the institutional arrangements (such as property rights, standards, regulations, trade policies, legitimating practices, R&D efforts, financing arrangements, consumption patterns, market structure, etc.) that help and hinder the development and commercialization of new products, services, and technologies. Over the past fifteen years, TIM scholars have also taken a more dynamic institutional and political view of innovation, increasingly viewing technical and institutional innovations as coevolving. They view the development and commercialization of technological innovations as collective achievements in constructing an industrial infrastructure for economic development among actors who are distributed, partisan, and embedded in path-dependent processes. At this macro level of the interorganizational field, the processes of technological innovation and entrepreneurship have many similarities to social movements (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2002; Schoonhoven & Romanelli, 2001 ).
Here we call attention to four specific characteristics of institutional change processes that both SM and TIM scholars, to varying degrees, have begun to document. All speak to the purposive, contested, collective nature of institutional change. First, both sets of scholars have begun to view institutional change as involving framing contests, in which opposing actors, each seeking to achieve its goals, struggle against one another to frame and reframe the meanings of relevant issues and technologies. Second and third, TIM and SM scholars, especially the former, have called attention to the purposive efforts of institutional entrepreneurs to enact the organizational fields in which actions take place: they have described institutional entrepreneurs' efforts to construct networks of complementary players that collectively possess the skills and resources needed to achieve success and to enact the institutional arrangements that govern action in the organizational field. Fourth, both SM and TIM researchers have called attention to the collective action processes of institutional innovation, in which the form that change takes emerges as diverse and opposed actors collide, each seeking to effect institutional change in order to change material conditions and achieve its goals. Actors do not simply take the present institutional arrangements, coalitions of actors, and dominant frames as given, yet, while they attempt to influence and change the organizational field, they cannot control the form and pace of change. Framing contests Calls attention to the creation and manipulation of the meanings of issues (Benford & Snow, 2000; Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Edwards, 1982; Lounsbury, 2002; Maguire, 2002; Rao, 1998) Says little about the creation and manipulation of the meanings of new technologies (an exception is Dowell, Swaminathan, & Wade, 2002) Construction of networks Describes organizing forms and resources that activists have employed to pursue social change (Gerlach & Palmer, 1981; McAdam & Scott, 2002; Tilly, 1978) Documents efforts to create cooperative networks of innovation (Cusumano, Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992; Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Green, 1992; Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999) 
Enactment of institutional arrangements
Describes efforts of activists to challenge and alter "political opportunity structures" (Fligstein, 1996 (Fligstein, , 2001 McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1996) Describes efforts of technology entrepreneurs to build the institutional infrastructures needed to realize innovations (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Garud & Rappa, 1994; Van de Ven & Garud, 1994 ) Collective action processes Says little about the dialectical sequences of events by which social change is made (exceptions are Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000, and McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001) Describes the contested political processes through which new technologies emerge (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Murmann & Tushman, 2001) gies. TIM scholars, however, have given more attention to temporal sequences of change events and stages than have SM scholars. (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly [2001] is a notable exception.) We now take a closer look at how SM and TIM scholars have treated each of the constructs in Table 2 to examine collective action of institutional innovation.
Framing Contests
It is widely recognized that shared meanings of institutional arrangements are socially constructed in the organizational field. Less appreciated is the idea that collective understandings emerge from battles over meaning and, indeed, are constantly under challenge. This idea of framing contests has emerged as a hallmark of the new SM theory. Along with political opportunity structures and resource mobilization, framing processes have come to be regarded by SM scholars as central to understanding social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000) . Activists are "signifying agents" (Snow & Benford, 1988) who are engaged in "the politics of signification" (Hall, 1982) . Morrill, Zald, and Rao (2003) note that a dominant frame is seldom a consensual frame and that frames are "contested terrains" over control and power (Edwards, 1982) . Frame settlements are temporary truces to political conflict and struggle among opposing coalitions. Benford and Snow (2000) view framing as involving three overlapping processes: (1) a discursive process, in which the collective action frame is articulated; (2) a strategic process, in which frames are connected to movement purposes and goals; and (3) a contested process, in which activists work out internal "framing disputes" (Benford, 1993) and engage in "framing contests" (Ryan, 1991) that involve movement opponents, the media, and others. According to Benford and Snow (2000) , framing involves three core tasks: (1) diagnostic framing, which concerns how problems are defined and who is to blame for them; (2) prognostic framing, which involves the articulation of solutions and appropriate strategies for attaining them; and (3) motivational framing, which serves as a "call to arms" for social movement members. Gamson (1995) sees motivational framing as entailing the development of the "agency" component of collective action frames.
Frames are rarely constructed out of whole cloth; instead, they are fabricated from already available repertoires and cultural artifacts (Strang & Bradburn, 2001; Tarrow, 1994) . Actors interpret and impose their schemas on existing institutional arrangements and are able to reproduce themselves when they are able to frame issues in ways that support their frames and eliminate the possibility of creating or reproducing alternative frames (Clemens & Cook, 1999) .
In an investigation of the adoption of innovations in the treatment of HIV/AIDS, Maguire (2002) presents empirical evidence of the importance of framing for social movement success. He documents the efforts of AIDS activists to win the establishment of a fast-track drug approval process that made possible the widespread adoption of new treatments prior to the conclusion of scientific trials assessing the safety and efficacy of those treatments. AIDS activists were not only able to change the outcomes emanating from the FDA's drug approval process but also to force a negotiation of both the structure of the drug approval system and the nature and role of the evidence used in the process. They did so by raising epistemological and methodological questions about the conduct of clinical trials, the drug approval process, and the criteria on which approval was based. Maguire shows that activists changed the institutional process through which treatments are adopted in the United States by framing critical questions about the structure and function of the process in resonant ethical terms. Lounsbury (2002) demonstrates the impacts of framing on the ability of local environmental activists to organize to promote recycling of garbage. Because activists initially envisioned recycling as a means of restructuring economic relations and of addressing problems such as mass consumerism, the emergence of advocacy groups was at first limited to states that were conducive to ecological activism. Once recycling was reframed in "technocratic" terms, as an alternative to incineration, rather than in "holistic" terms, then recycling advocacy groups began to emerge more broadly.
Framing contests are also an important dimension of the globalization of business regulation. These contests play out in "epistemic communities" (Haas, 1989) , which are "loose collections of knowledge-based experts who share certain attitudes and values and substan-tive knowledge, as well as ways of thinking about how to use that knowledge" (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000: 501) . Braithwaite and Drahos identify a dialectical tension among some of the key principles invoked in international business regulation negotiations, noting that the principles of harmonization and mutual recognition are used in opposition to the principle of national sovereignty and that the principles of low cost location and rule compliance are used in opposition to the principles of diffusion of best practices, continuous improvement, and best available technology. These scholars conclude that agents of change can be especially effective when they invoke multiple principles and use principles rhetorically and instrumentally, rather than just symbolically.
TIM scholars have traditionally paid less attention to framing processes in which the meanings and understandings of new technologies are shaped. This may be changing, however. Rao (2001) and Swaminathan and Wade (2001) observe that, like social movement leaders, entrepreneurs in emerging industries face the key task of gaining cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy. Dowell and colleagues (2002) demonstrate that proponents and opponents of highdensity television (HDTV) engaged in collective framing processes to influence the trajectory of HDTV in the United States. They show that broadcasters, who opposed HDTV because of potentially high costs, initially failed to thwart the emergence of HDTV because they framed their opposition around a technical argument about signal interference that had little empirical credibility and failed to connect to a "master frame" that had broad appeal. Later, however, broadcasters succeeded in opposing HDTV when they argued that the emergence of HDTV would result in a loss to the Japanese of the United States' small remaining share of the consumer electronics market.
Construction of Networks
SM scholars have long examined the agents of social change in terms of "mobilizing structures," which are the resources and organizations through which people engage in collective action. McAdam and Scott (2002) view mobilizing structures as the institutional actors that are the building blocks of social movements and revolutions. An issue or idea only becomes an "opportunity" when defined as such by a group of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared definition of the situation.
The formal and informal networks that connect individuals and organizations are among the most important aspects of mobilizing structures (Tilly, 1978) . Networks serve as conduits though which new models, concepts, and practices diffuse and become part of an organization's repertoire (Campbell, 2002) . SM scholars increasingly have focused their attention on the efforts of activists to construct networks that enable collective action. While one might expect that such efforts were of central importance to resource mobilization theorists, McAdam and colleagues point out that resource mobilization theory (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1973) was "less a theory about the emergence or development of social movements than it was an attempt to describe and map a new social movement formprofessional social movements" (1996: 4). It was actually the political process model of social movements that focused on the organizational dynamics of collective action. Here, Tilly (1978) laid the theoretical foundation, documenting the critical role of various grassroots settings-work and neighborhood, in particular-in facilitating and structuring collective action (McAdam et al., 1996) . McAdam et al. (2001) further develop this idea. They write that agents of change must either create an organization or appropriate an existing one and turn it into an instrument of contention. They note that, in the case of the Civil Rights Movement (McAdam, 1982, discussed earlier) , black churches had been conservative organizations that focused on rewards in the next life until they were mobilized by movement leaders. "Early movement leaders had to engage in creative cultural/organizational work, by which the aims of the church and its animating collective identity were redefined to accord with the goals of the emerging struggle" (McAdam et al., 2001: 47) .
McAdam and colleagues (2001) refer to two exemplary case studies of movement mobilization, both of which document the social movement in the Philippines to overthrow the Marcos government. First, they describe Boudreau's (2001) case study of "the efforts of established left oppositional interests to recruit coalition partners from among grassroots organizations of the poor" (McAdam et al., 2001: 115) . These opposition groups did more than provide organizational resources to grassroots groups and urban and middle class protesters; they sought to "appropriate the routine identities and everyday networks of shared fate and trust of previously inactive . . . social groupings" (McAdam et al., 2001: 115) . Second, McAdam et al. describe how Hedman (1998) takes a different perspective on the Philippine Revolution by calling attention to the mobilization of the Philippine middle and upper classes. She shows that these classes were drawn into the revolution not by established opposition groups but primarily through more moderate umbrella organizations that emerged during the struggle. Boudreau's and Hedman's accounts demonstrate that collective action requires both the ability to appropriate existing vehicles and the ability to create new ones.
Warren's Dry Bones Rattling (2001) provides a rich empirical study of how community activists from the Texas Industrial Area Foundation (Texas IAF) worked to build an interfaith and multiracial network of collective action in the southwestern United States. The Texas IAF is a chapter of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), founded in the 1930s by famed community organizer Saul Alinsky to organize poor communities. Warren observes that the Texas IAF was able both to create broader, state-level power and to maintain a focus on local participation because it simultaneously engaged in both bottom-up and top-down organizing processes. While regional network leaders and professional organizers offered central direction to community organizers, at the same time the Texas IAF served as a "free space" for community leaders to communicate and collaborate.
Warren examines the difficulties in balancing tensions between local participation and topdown authority in the Texas IAF. He argues that both participation and authority are needed, writing that "most advocates of participatory democracy have become uncomfortable with discussions of authority, but utopian preferences for pure egalitarian relationships are unrealistic for developing effective power for communities" (2001: 35) . Dry Bones Rattling reminds us that while network construction (and therefore social movements) will fail without directive leadership, it is a process that is rife with dynamic tensions and is as much emergent as planned.
In her account of attempts to introduce afrocentrism and creationism into American public schools, Binder (2002) integrates accounts of framing battles and network construction. She highlights the importance to social movement success of understanding other actors' sources of power when targeting framing activities. Binder concludes that creationists were largely unsuccessful in their attempts to introduce creationism into school district curricula because they targeted their message to insiders, such as school board members and legislators. These insiders had political authority, but because they were not involved in the routine education system, they were not seen as legitimate by educators in the crafting of educational policy. The creationists' message therefore never took hold and failed to become institutionalized.
Long before it became well known because of its use by such groups as al-Qaeda, Gerlach and Palmer (1981) identified a highly flexible and adaptive network organizing model, which they referred to as a "segmented, polycentric, integrated network" (SPIN) structure. Gerlach (2001) points out that SPINs are neither bureaucratic and centralized nor amorphous; instead, they are composed of many diverse yet networked groups that follow no single leader. The groups are united by their opposition to a shared enemy and by their shared ideology. SPINs are adaptive because their multiplicity prevents effective suppression by the opposition, enables penetration into a variety of social niches, permits division of labor and adaptation to circumstances, contributes to system reliability (in that one part can fail without harming the others), and escalates the level of effort (owing to competition among groups).
TIM researchers have examined the efforts of technology entrepreneurs to enact the networks of actors needed to pursue the development and commercialization of new technologies. Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom (1992) observed that the selection of the VHS over Betamax formats for videocassette recorders was due mainly to the use of strategic alliances by the JVC Company, which sponsored the VHS format. Stuart (2000) determined that a focal firm's level of innovation in the semiconductor industry increased after it developed an alliance with a very innovative firm and, similarly, that a firm's sales growth rate increased after that firm began its alliance with a large firm.
The benefits of forming an alliance with an innovative or a larger firm were more pronounced for young or small firms because it signaled legitimacy for the smaller firms. And, as already noted, Garud et al. (2002) showed that, as part of its effort to establish Java as a technological standard, Sun Microsystems built a coalition of assemblers, software makers, and computer manufacturers.
More broadly, Teece (1987) , Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, and Ventakataraman (1999) , and Ruttan (2001) have argued that, in the early stages of technology development, when the institution of market does not yet exist, firms sponsoring a radically new product technology must cooperate and compete with other firms in the public and private sectors to create this and other institutions. Similarly, Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) have pointed out that social, political, and organizational actions such as collaboration and collusion dictate the course of technological change until a dominant design emerges, at which point technical and economic factors begin to determine the course of change. In their study of the biotechnology industry, Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) found that when the knowledge base of an industry is both complex and expanding and the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of innovation is found in networks of learning, rather than in individual firms. Research breakthroughs demand a range of intellectual and scientific skills that exceed the capabilities of any single organization. Powell (1998) points out that collaboration may create entry barriers to the extent that capabilities are situated or embedded in the interacting parties. Collaboration may itself become a dimension of competition, as firms develop a network of ties to specific partners for certain activities and resources. Technological progress goes hand-in-hand with the evolution of the industry and its supporting institutions.
In their study of the birth of the flat panel display industry, Murtha, Lenway, and Hart (2001) found that the industry emerged through the efforts of an international community of companies, each leveraging unique, national capabilities. In the race to create new knowledge and learn, companies seek close relationships to gain access to specialized capabilities that they can leverage in combination with their own. These include both direct and indirect relationships with competitors and potential competitors, as well as relationships with universities, research labs, suppliers, and customers. Critical bodies of new knowledge and technology accumulate in shared rather than proprietary domains of activity, such as interactions with equipment and materials makers whose customer base includes multiple competitors in the same industry.
The "free-rider" problem in collective action has received much attention from Olson (1965) and his followers. These researchers ask why self-interested rational individuals would engage in building collective goods. The phenomenon of open source software development provides a clue. The key feature of open source software is that programmers make their code available to all who want it. Examples include Apache server software and Linux operating system software. Developers typically are software users rather than software manufacturers. Von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) argue that open source programmers reveal their code rather than appropriate private returns because doing so enables them to earn greater private benefits than they would by taking a strictly proprietary approach to software development. Benefits of collective action include the potential to increase sales of complementary goods and intangibles, such as elevated reputations and expected reciprocity (Harhoff, Henkel, & von Hippel, 2003; Lerner & Tirole, 2000; von Krogh, 2002) . Open source software developers meet greater success by "running in packs" (Van de Ven et al., 1999: 2) than by going it alone.
Networks of cooperating and competing actors do not emerge all at once because of the actions of one or even a few key individuals. Instead, they are built through an accretion of numerous events involving many actors who transcend boundaries of public and private sector organizations (Van de Ven et al., 1999) . The sequence of events in which individual actors become engaged in collective action to construct an institutional infrastructure and pursue technological development can begin in any number of ways, and it varies with the technology being developed. For example, it can begin with the ideas of entrepreneurs, who undertake a stream of activities to gain the resources, competencies, and endorsements necessary to develop an economically viable enterprise. As these activities are undertaken, the paths of independent entrepreneurs, acting out their own diverse intentions and ideas, intersect. These interactions provide occasions for recognizing areas for establishing cooperative and competitive relationships (Romanelli, 1991) .
In a study of the development of cochlear implants, Van de Ven and Garud (1993) found that cooperative relationships emerge among the actors who can achieve complementary benefits by integrating their functional specializations or institutional roles. Competitive relationships emerge as alternative technological paths become evident and different entrepreneurs or firms "place their bets on" and pursue alternative paths. During this initial period, applied R&D activities are highly uncertain and often dependent on basic science and technology. Depending on the technological alternative chosen, entrepreneurs become highly dependent on different clusters of basic research institutions, such as universities and laboratories, that have been producing and directing the accumulation of basic knowledge, techniques, and experience associated with a given technological alternative.
By engaging in cooperative and competitive relationships and by interacting in the same networks, groups of entrepreneurs in the public and private sectors increasingly isolate themselves from traditional industries by virtue of their interdependencies and growing commitments to the unique knowledge of a new technology. Isolation frees an emerging system from the institutional constraints of existing technologies and industries (Astley, 1985) and permits it to develop its own distinctive institutional forms (Rappa, 1987) . Coordination among actors takes place not so much by a central plan, hierarchy, or price mechanism but mostly through interactions (Mattsson, 1987) and partisan mutual adjustments among actors (Lindblom, 1965) . As the number of organizational units and actors gains a critical mass, a complex network of cooperative and competitive relationships begins to accumulate. This network itself becomes recognized as a new "industrial sector, and takes the form of a hierarchical, loosely coupled system" ( Van de Ven et al., 1999: 169) . This emerging network consists of the key entrepreneurs and firms that govern, integrate, and play diverse roles in transforming a technological community into a commercially viable industry.
Enactment of Institutional Arrangements
Both SM and TIM researchers have studied the institutional arrangements in which institutional change takes place, as well as the efforts of social activists and technological entrepreneurs to enact these arrangements. In the SM literature, McAdam et al. (2001) describe how social movement activists engage in a dialectical political struggle with entrenched interests over the "shape" and governance of institutionalized systems of power. Campbell (2002) views the political opportunity structure in the organizational field as a set of formal and informal political conditions that encourage, discourage, channel, and otherwise affect movement activity. Political opportunity structures vary in the degree to which formal political institutions are open or closed to those who challenge the status quo, the degree to which political elites are organized in stable or unstable coalitions and alignments, the degree to which movements have allies within the political elite, and the degree to which political authorities are willing to repress challengers (Campbell, 2002; McAdam et al., 1996; Tarrow, 1996) .
Fligstein uses a "political-cultural" approach to describe the "architecture of markets" (1996: 663), arguing that, "in new markets, the politics resemble social movements" (2001: 76). Contrary to economic explanations of markets (e.g., Williamson, 1975 ), Fligstein argues that markets are politically negotiated orders, structured by powerful actors to "solve the problems of competition and uncertainty" (2001: 69). He sees the search for stable interactions as the main cause of social structure in markets and asserts that this need for stability explains the role of government. Fligstein writes that, at the very least, government must ratify firms' abilities to use structures that mediate competition and conflict, and, at most, government should intervene directly into markets to stabilize them. Governments do not develop rules innocently; rather, these rules reflect power relations. Further, while all industrial societies must deal with the issue of market stability, they do so in culturally distinctive ways. Fligstein finds that the characteristics of the national market reflect the relative balance of power among government, labor, and capitalists at the time of market creation.
In their examination of the enactment and repeal of anti-chain store legislation in the United States, Ingram and Rao (2004) provide a rich account of the central role of enactment of institutional infrastructure in contested processes of institutional change. They recount the efforts of supporters of independent stores to establish state-level tax laws designed to drive chain stores (such as the current-day Wal-Mart, Target, and McDonald's) out of business, as well as the countermobilization by chain stores to rescind these laws. The pro-chain store movement ultimately won the battle over the shape of the market by developing national alliances with sympathetic actors and by appealing successfully to the U.S. Supreme Court to repeal unfriendly state tax laws. Ingram and Rao's narrative demonstrates that marketplace success requires strategic political action to define the institutional arrangements governing competition. This strategic action can include the mobilization of one set of existing institutions against other institutions existing in a nested infrastructure of governance and precedence.
TIM researchers have also examined the institutional infrastructure for developing and commercializing technological innovations. Garud (1989, 1993) have sketched a framework that incorporates the various components of an industrial infrastructure for technological innovation. This framework presents an augmented view of an industry as consisting not only of the set of firms producing similar or substitute products (Porter, 1980) but also many other public and private sector actors who perform the following critical roles in developing and commercializing a new technology.
• Institutional regulations: These are the governmental agencies, professional trade associations, and scientific/technical communities that legitimate, regulate, and standardize a technology.
• Resource endowments: These include advancements in basic scientific and technological knowledge, financing and insurance arrangements, and training of competent professionals.
• Consumer demand: For new-to-the-world technologies, informed, competent, and responsible consumers do not preexist; the market must be created.
• Proprietary activities: These transform the available supply of public resources (scientific knowledge and workforce competence) into proprietary products and services to meet customer demand.
The Garud (1989, 1993) framework has been extended in studies of technological communities by Garud and Rappa (1994) , new business start-ups by Aldrich and Fiol (1994) , the American film industry by Mezias and Kuperman (2000) , and Java technology standards by Garud et al. (2002) .
Many TIM scholars have studied the development of selective components of this institutional infrastructure for technological innovation. Green (1992) has examined how a market may not exist for a new technology and may have to be shaped. For a market to exist, institutions must first be in place to establish prices, to inform customers and suppliers, and to provide distribution arrangements. Entrepreneurs developing radically new technologies must often engage in collective action with others to create these institutions. Bower and Christensen (1995) have examined the case of disruptive technologies, where information about potential customers, dimensions of product performance of importance to customers, and pricing level can only be acquired by experimenting with the product and the market.
Collective Action Processes
SM and TIM scholars point out that the process of institutional change is often a political process of mobilizing campaigns to legitimate a social or technical innovation (Rao, 2001 ). Legitimacy has both cognitive and sociopolitical dimensions (Aldrich, 1999; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Stinchcombe, 1965) . Cognitive legitimacy refers to the taken-for-granted assumption that an institutional change is desirable, proper, and appropriate within a widely shared system of norms and values (Scott, 2001 , Stryker, 1994 . Sociopolitical legitimacy consists of endorsements and the support of key constituents, such as financial investors, government officials, consumers, and others who play key roles in developing and implementing an innovation (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Rao, 2001) . New institutions gain cognitive legitimacy when entrepreneurs or activists succeed in framing their projects as valid, reliable, and useful (Rao, 2001) . To accomplish this, entrepreneurs and activists must engage in political processes that often resemble social movements Fligstein, 1996 Fligstein, , 2001 Rao, 1998; Snow & Benford, 1992) . Clemens and Cook (1999) provide a theoretical treatment of institutional change that integrates structurational, ecological, and dialectical process models of change. They argue that institutions are not always reliably reproduced and that the containment or diffusion of variations depends on social network characteristics, the degree to which actors learn, the degree of contradictions within institutions, and the multiplicity of institutions. Clemens (1997) presents empirical evidence of dialectical institutional change in her account of the emergence of interest group politics in the United States; she found that, at the turn of the twentieth century, social movement actors produced institutional change by exploiting contradictions in existing institutional logics, appropriating legitimate cultural repertoires (organizational forms), and then using them in inappropriate ways.
McAdam et al. (2001) take the classical SM framework, which they describe as too static, and make it more dynamic by calling attention to the recursive, interactive nature of the relationships among macro and micro processes in social movements. They view macro processes of social change (e.g., revolution or democratization) as the concatenation of narrower processes, such as polarization and changes in public politics. These processes are themselves particular arrangements of even lower-level processes, which they refer to as mechanisms. Examples of such mechanisms include the dissolution of trust networks among elites and the formation of cross-class coalitions. In their SM process model, threats and opportunities are socially constructed, not objectively present or absent. In addition, and as already discussed, their model posits that movements are mobilized primarily through existing networks and organizations that are then appropriated by the social movement rather than through organizations created specifically to advance the social movement.
Schö n (1971) and Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) propose similar process models of institutional change, viewing change as characteristically precipitated by the occurrence or the framing of a disruptive event that triggers appreciation of a threatening problem or a new opportunity. Once appreciated, ideas gestating in peripheral areas begin to surface in the mainstream as a result of the efforts of entrepreneurs who supply the energy necessary to raise their ideas into public consciousness. As these ideas surface, networks of individuals and interest groups galvanize around selected ideas, while others fall into oblivion. These networks, in turn, exert their own influence on the ideas by reframing them, often with catchy slogans that provide emotional meaning and energy.
However, these ideas do not achieve cognitive legitimacy and potency to change public policy unless they become an issue for political debate and unless they are used to gain influence and resources. The debate turns not only on the merits of the ideas but also on who is using them as vehicles to gain power. As ideas are adopted and supported by powerful actors, they gain the legitimacy and power to change institutions. After this, the ideas that win out are implemented, adopted, and diffused-they become part of the institutionalized thought structure (Warren, 1971) and appear obvious, in retrospect. Schö n (1971) points out, however, that an idea remains institutionalized for only as long as it continues to address critical problems or opportunities, and only for as long as the regime remains in power.
In a number of TIM studies, researchers have examined the political and collective processes through which standards for evaluating new technologies are developed and dominant technological designs emerge. In their study of Sun Microsystems' sponsorship of the Java technological standard (discussed in the introduction), for instance, Garud et al. (2002) found that organizations socially construct institutions, sponsor their creation, and try to catalyze their legitimation. They conclude that the process of institutional entrepreneurship is fraught with dialectical challenges. First, because agency in the structuration of the field creates opposition and mobilizes collective action, institutional entrepreneurs must both overcome inertia and take on vested interests. Further, mobilizing collective action is made difficult by "legitimacy traps"-that is, others will view entrepreneurship as self-interested and not in the best interests of the field as a whole. Garud and colleagues also document the problem of "coopetition"-the difficulty of achieving cooperation among competitors. They note that maintaining collective action may be difficult because others may want to start challenging the newly formed institution even as it is emerging. Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch (1987) observe that the selection of technology standards occurs through a process of negotiation among relevant social groups and reflects the extent to which evaluation criteria are influenced in favor of the existing technology. Evaluation policy for an existing technology plays a role analogous to that played by an accepted paradigm in an area of scientific explanation. It comprises a system of judgments as to which factors are important, how each is measured, and how they are to be valued (Wojick, 1979) . Except in the case of simple technologies, technological designs are seldom adjudicated based on technological considerations alone; dominant designs emerge out of a sociopolitical process of compromise and accommodation played out in the community (Murmann & Tushman, 2001; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1994) . The "best" technology does not necessarily win the competition between alternative designs. Garud (1989, 1993) found that, in technology-intensive industries, fragmentation of interests across industry participants can hinder collective action. Uneven developments in complementary technologies and institutions often create bottlenecks that delay or detour market introductions of innovations. Industry participants may promote their own interests and fail to advance the interests of the overall industry in obtaining legitimacy.
In their study of technological change in the cement, glass, and minicomputer industries, Anderson and Tushman (1990) adopted a punctuated equilibrium model of cyclical change, in which a technological breakthrough initiates an era of industry ferment that is marked by competition for dominance and that culminates in convergence on a single dominant design. During eras of ferment, competition takes place both between the old and new technological regimes and within the new regime. "Competence-destroying" technological breakthroughs face more stubborn opposition from entrenched interests than "competence-enhancing" breakthroughs (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) . These authors conclude that the "actions of individuals, organizations, and networks of organizations shape dominant designs" and that "the closing on an industry standard is an inherently political and organizational phenomenon constrained by technical possibilities. The passage of an industry from ferment to order is not an engineering issue as much as a sociological one" (Andersen & Tushman, 1990: 627) .
DISCUSSION
The collective action model that emerges from this review of the TIM and SM literature provides a promising explanation of the process of institutional innovation. However, considerable work lies ahead to actualize this promise. The model is based on a dialectical theory of change in which opposing actors in the organizational field frame issues, mobilize collective actions, and engage in contested processes in order to achieve material improvement, be it technical or social. This collective action model emphasizes the importance of conflict, power, and politics in explaining institutional innovation. Although institutional scholars have begun to incorporate these concepts into their studies of institutional change (Fligstein, 1996 (Fligstein, , 2001 Ingram & Rao, 2004; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Rao, 1998; Rao et al., 2003) , we believe that these concepts continue to be undertheorized by institutionalists and deserve a central place on the institutional research agenda. Fortunately, a rich body of literature on these concepts can be drawn on to develop a collective action model of institutional innovation and change.
Dialectical theories explain stability and change in terms of the relative balance of power between opposing entities (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) . Stability is produced through struggles and accommodations that maintain the status quo between oppositions. Innovation occurs when challengers gain sufficient power to confront and engage incumbents. Singer, discussing Hegel's perspective on dialectics, writes that,
In the categories of our thought, in the development of consciousness, and in the progress of history, there are opposing elements which lead to the disintegration of what seemed stable, and the emergence of something new which reconciles the previously opposing elements but in turn develops its own internal tension (2001: 103).
In dialectical processes, the current thesis or institutional arrangement (A) is challenged by an opposing group espousing an antithesis (Not-A), which sets the stage for producing a synthesis (Not Not-A). This synthesis becomes the new thesis as the dialectical process recycles and continues. By its very nature, the synthesis is something new, discontinuous with thesis and antithesis.
An alternative to the Hegelian dialectic is the tension dialectic, or dialogic model (Bakhtin, 1981) , which examines a never-ending series of tensions between oppositions. Each side on an issue requires the other to exist, and there is a constant interplay between the two. Opposing groups mutually imply each other, exist through their opposition, and always remain at work as potential sources of change. Institutional arrangements consist of multiple tensions that exist simultaneously, such as pressures for integration-differentiation, exploration-exploitation, and interdependence-independence. Change is shaped by the political strategies and tactics that opposing groups adopt to deal with the dialectic and the challenges and conflicts that it spawns.
The concepts of conflict, power, and politics are central to a dialectical theory of change. Conflict is the core generating mechanism of change, power is a necessary condition for the expression of conflict, and political strategies and tactics are the means by which parties engage in conflict. Conflict entails direct confrontation and struggle among opposing parties within institutional constraints. Societies prohibit the use of violence or physical force among conflicting parties but permit parties to engage in social and economic conflict within reasonable institutional boundaries. Conflict is the means by which dialectical tensions play out. A necessary condition for conflict to be expressed is that the opposing parties have sufficient power to confront each other and engage in struggle. Conflict tends to remain latent or to be squelched by dominant actors until challengers can mobilize sufficient power by engaging in political strategies and tactics of collective action to gain support for their demands. Yet the relationship among conflict, power, and political behaviors and institutions is recursive; just as conflict, power, and politics are central to institutional change, so, too, institutions shape the forms that conflict, power, and politics take. Conflict and power relations become institutionalized and are reproduced through taken-forgranted arrangements and routine behaviors.
Conflict
Conflict has been viewed as functional by sociologists. Coser (1957) argued that conflict not only generates new norms and institutions but also stimulates economic and technological development. He stated that in societies where a sense of solidarity exists, members need not fear conflict and should welcome it. Simmel (1955) also took the view that conflict and contradiction are at work every moment and that for society to have a shape, it must have a ratio of harmony and disharmony, association, and competition. Simmel viewed conflict as an integrative force. He believed that depriving a group of opposition could be as damaging to the group as the removal of cooperation. Here Simmel foreshadowed social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Turner, 1982) , which posits that social identities are maintained by intergroup comparisons: group members seek to enhance their self-esteem by drawing distinctions between their groups and others'. An important implication for understanding the dynamics of collective action processes is that intergroup conflict may occur because of the very existence of groups.
Viewing conflict as latent yet ever present and as a source of creativity enables a different perspective on institutional change. This perspective makes clear that the taken-for-grantedness of institutions will inevitably be shattered and that change is ongoing. The "old" institutionalist, John R. Commons, highlighted this point. To Commons, (1950) the institutions existing at a specific time represented nothing more than imperfect and pragmatic solutions to past conflicts. Commons thought of institutional history as a process of willful selection of one set of institutional practices over alternative sets-a process of pragmatic decision making involving "the discovery through investigation and negotiation of what is the best practicable thing to do under the actual circumstances of conflicting interests, organized as they are, to impose their collective wills on individuals and each other" (1950: 25).
Power
Power is another concept that is central to collective action processes and that needs further development in institutional theorizing. As already noted, the concept of power is intimately bound up with the concept of conflict, in the sense that conflict cannot become manifest unless opposing parties have sufficient power to confront each other. In organizational theory it is, of course, the resource dependence view (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978 ) that most explicitly relates action to power, asserting that organizations that control resources on which others are dependent are able to influence the actions of those others.
Oliver (1991) is one of the few institutional scholars who has given attention to power. Seeking to redress early neoinstitutional theory's lack of attention to human agency, she has combined institutional theory with resource dependence theory to develop a typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures. Oliver argues that, when responding to institutional pressures, organizations choose among strategies of acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. They match their choices to the pressures they face. According to Oliver, key contingencies shaping an organization's response to institutional pressures include the amount of social legitimacy and economic gain at stake, whether or not the focal organization is dependent on the constituent applying pressure, whether pressure is exerted through coercive or voluntary means, and the degree of environmental uncertainty. While Oliver's framework is sensitive to power issues, it specifies other contingencies as well.
Just as power shapes the course of institutional change, it also derives from institutions. Institutions provide a framework in which power struggles play out. The resources that one controls and that are a source of one's power may have as their source a law, norm, or widely taken-for-granted belief. Commons (1950) argued that institutions enable and constrain the exercise of individual power and action. Liberation for some actors is achieved by establishing institutional constraints (rights and duties) on others. Commons emphasized that the power of individuals to exercise their freedom is not a natural right; he viewed it as a collective institutional achievement. "The only way in which 'liberty' can be obtained is by imposing duties on others who might interfere with the activity of the 'liberated' individual. . . . Thus, collective action is literally a means to liberty" (Commons, 1950: 35) . During his time, much of the labor union and collective bargaining movement focused on creating institutions that would protect workers as legal equals to employers in negotiating their employment contracts, given the overwhelming economic and social power of corporations over individual workers.
The idea that power shapes behavior as it operates through institutions has important implications for institutional research. Most significantly, it raises the possibility that organizations' institution-building (and -destroying) activities are driven not by efficiency considerations, nor even by the desire to gain legitimacy among members of the organizational field. Rather, action is driven by the desire to maintain power or to appear legitimate in the eyes of those who control the organization's resources. This idea is not adequately reflected in existing models of change.
Political Behavior
The outcomes of collective action processes are not foreordained; politics are central to processes of institutional innovation. An assessment of social movements suggests that history might have turned out differently had particular political strategies and tactics not been used. One might ask, for example, whether the Civil Rights Movement would have succeeded had activists not invented and implemented political tactics such as sit-ins, boycotts, voter registration drives, and court actions (McAdam, 1982) .
Scholars have presented rich descriptions of political strategies and tactics used by institutional entrepreneurs to effect institutional change (Clemens, 1997; Garud et al., 2002; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Rao, 1998; Rao et al., 2003) . Further work is needed to catalog these political strategies and to identify the situations or contingencies in which they work. Fligstein (1997) has initiated work in this direction. Echoing Alinsky's (1971) Rules for Radicals, he has cataloged entrepreneurial tactics and described the social skills that the institutional entrepreneur needs to effect institutional change. Whereas Alinsky emphasized attack over forebearance, some of Fligstein's tactics (e.g., "agenda setting") can be characterized as manipulative, while others (e.g., "taking what the system gives") can be characterized as adaptive or as a form of affordance (1997: 399) . Warren (2001) provides an important extension and revision of Alinsky's political strategies and tactics based on his observations of the leaders of the Texas IAF, discussed earlier. These leaders advanced a "theology of organiz-ing" that started with Alinsky's principles of organizing but then modified and adapted them in numerous ways. Most significantly, the Texas IAF showed a willingness to compromise, whereas Alinsky felt that confrontation was necessary to accomplish change. According to Warren, the Texas IAF was supremely pragmatic in its political behavior, adhering to the adage "no permanent allies, no permanent enemies" (Warren, 2001: 33) . Confrontation, cooperation, and compromise were all part of the Texas IAF's political toolkit.
What would a parsimonious theory of strategies and tactics look like? We believe that it would portray the choice of strategy as contingent on the relative bases of power of the focal actor and opposing groups-both institutionalized and informal. It would clarify those legal rights and duties of parties that are institutionally protected, as well as the relative social and economic dependencies among the parties in the context of the specific issue being contested. Based on these contingencies, the theory would specify the political strategies and tactics various parties might employ. Oliver's (1991) typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures, discussed above, provides one possible starting point in developing such a theory. Lindblom (1965) provides another. In The Intelligence of Democracy (1965) , Lindblom describes the processes of "partisan mutual adjustment" by which interdependent actors in public policy-making settings coordinate their actions without the benefit of or need for a central coordinator. Lindblom states that when actors are interdependent, they interfere with each other's goal achievement and, therefore, must adjust to one another. He offers a taxonomy of mutual adjustment methods that distinguishes manipulative methods, such as negotiation, compensation, and unconditional manipulation, from adaptive methods, such as deference and calculation. Power considerations run through Lindblom's framework; for example, he distinguishes three types of negotiation-participant discussion, reciprocity, and bargaining-based on the source of power of the focal actor. One engages in discussion when one can only appeal to the other, bargains when one can effectively make a threat or promise, and engages in reciprocity when mutual obligation exists.
Just as political behaviors influence the course of institutional change, so, too, the reverse is true: political tactics are influenced by the institutional environment. Stryker (2000) offers a definition of politics that emphasizes the centrality of institutions and institutional change in contests between opposing groups. She echoes Commons (1950) in stating that politics involves rules of the game that establish authority figures and influence processes. The constitutive rules of any system . . . create positions allocating authoritative decision making to incumbents of some positions and duties to obey to incumbents of others (see, e.g., Weber, 1978) . Constitutive rules . . . also define the source of authority and govern the distribution and aggregation of key influence-relevant resources. Thus, constitutive rules shape actor expectations about whose influence attempts and which influence strategies are more or less likely to be effective (Stryker, 2000: 179 -180) .
In sum, theories of institutional change would benefit from a recognition that conflict, power, and politics both shape and are shaped by institutions. Just as actors exert their power and engage in conflict and political behaviors to influence the institutional environment, existing institutions govern the exercise of power, the form that conflict takes, and the political behaviors that are viewed as appropriate. There is a relationship of mutual coproduction among conflict, power, and politics, on the one hand, and institutional change, on the other.
Relationship of Collective Action to Other Models of Institutional Change
The collective action model calls attention to a rich agenda of scholarship on conflict, power, and political behavior for understanding institutional innovation. Moreover, the model represents an important complement to existing models of institutional change.
Near the beginning of this paper, we identified the institutional design, institutional adaptation, institutional diffusion, and collective action models as four distinct models of institutional change. It is helpful to array these models of institutional change in a typology as shown in Figure 1 . Following Van de Ven and Poole (1995) , this figure presents the four models in a typology that is based on the mode of change and the focus of analysis.
Mode of change.
The institutional design and collective action models focus on the construction of institutional arrangements, whereas the institutional adaptation and institutional diffusion models focus on the reproduction of institutional arrangements among institutional actors through evolutionary and adaptive processes. The design and collective action models emphasize agency as the basis of action, whereas the adaptation and diffusion models emphasize the conditioning effects of institutions on actors. The construction perspective emphasizes how institutional actors change institutional arrangements, whereas the reproduction perspective emphasizes how institutional arrangements change institutional actors.
Focus. The design and adaptation models "zoom in" on the behavior of focal actors who are engaged in designing or adopting an institutional arrangement, whereas the diffusion and collective action models "zoom out" to observe the construction or diffusion of an institutional arrangement among multiple actors at the level of the industry, population, or interorganizational field. This metaphor of an optical lens is useful in clarifying that different models of change may represent different views of the same process, rather than descriptions of different processes. One may choose to use a high degree of magnification to observe the behaviors of particular actors and a low degree of magnification to observe field dynamics.
Each of the four models of change emphasizes a particular mode of change (reproduction, construction) to the exclusion of the other, just as each brings a particular degree of focus (zoom in, zoom out) to the exclusion of the other. As a result, each emphasizes a particular aspect of institutional change processes but does not capture the full richness and complexity of these processes. Thus, while each provides a coherent perspective on institutional change, it is a onesided perspective. To paraphrase Poggi (1965) , each is both a way of seeing and a way of not seeing.
The incompleteness of one model of institutional change may be remedied by taking into consideration the perspectives of other models. Each model pictured in Figure 1 has one or more components whose values are determined exogenous to the model. The collective action model is no exception; it both completes and is completed by the other models. The institutional design model explains the mobilization of the antithesis in the collective action model; at the same time, the collective action model enriches
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Collective action The collective action model also extends the institutional diffusion model, clarifying that the source of variation in the diffusion model is the synthesis produced through dialectical struggle. In addition, the collective action model suggests that the social construction of the rules governing the selection of "fit" variations will be determined through a contested process in which actors mobilize their resources and other actors in an attempt to outcompete alternative framings. Finally, the collective action model suggests that, even when a particular argument has been selected and become institutionalized, competing arguments nevertheless lurk, suppressed yet available for mobilization by challengers of the status quo should these challengers gain sufficient power.
The complementarity of the collective action model with other models of institutional change becomes clear when we consider how the model could be used to extend specific and exemplary models of institutional change. We start with the institutional design model of Barley and Tolbert (1997) . These scholars infuse neoinstitutional theory with human agency by adapting Giddens' (1984) structuration model to argue that actors can consciously choose to revise rather than replicate existing institutions. Their model focuses on the individual; it does not address the issue of what happens when an actor seeks to revise an institutional arrangement but runs into opposition from powerful actors who seek to preserve that arrangement. It also does not address the possibility that the actor may seek to revise an institutional arrangement but lack the resources to do so. In short, the model presents institutionalization as a cognitive process that involves choice but not conflict.
Barley and Tolbert acknowledge that the "ability to foment change is likely to be constrained by the intransigence of others who, in lieu of a disturbance in the status quo, are likely to resist reopening previously negotiated agreements (Pettigrew 1987 (Pettigrew )" (1997 . Further, they write that "contextual change is usually necessary before actors can assemble the resources and rationales that are necessary for collectively questioning scripted patterns of behaviour" (1997: 102). They do not, however, theorize the contested processes to which they allude. The collective action model enriches Barley and Tolbert's model by explicitly considering sociopolitical processes as well as cognitive ones. It calls attention to the larger context in which the agent operates, suggests that this context is at least in part enacted by the agent, and proposes that the form that change takes is neither the antithesis espoused by the agent nor the thesis defended by incumbents. Hinings, Greenwood, Reay, and Suddaby (2004) illustrate the workings of a collective action model in their process model of institutional change. This model depicts institutional change as occurring when pressures for change are seized upon by institutional entrepreneurs who challenge existing ideas and advance new ones. These new ideas are institutionalized through field-level processes of theorization, a process of abstraction in which new ideas that are specific to a particular context are generalized to other contexts; legitimation, through which ideas come to be seen as right and appropriate; and dissemination to other actors in the organizational field. At the same time, old ideas undergo a process of deinstitutionalization. Power and politics are prominent in the interactions between incumbent and challenging regimes, as the latter attempts to mobilize support for its ideas by deinstitutionalizing established ideas and practices while the former simultaneously attempts to reinstitutionalize the status quo ideas and practices. The collective action model suggests that the form that change takes will conform neither to the thesis represented by incumbents nor to the antithesis presented by challengers. It also clarifies that contestation will occur when challengers first emerge, as Hinings and his colleagues observe, as well as during the stages of theorization and legitimation. The efforts of challengers to give justification and meaning to new ideas and practices are sure to be resisted by incumbents. The collective action model represents an important link in understanding the temporal stages or cycles of institutional change. The four models of institutional change can be thought of not only as alternative perspectives on a single phenomenon but also as representing different temporal phases of one complete institutional change process. We can think of the process of institutional change as unfolding over phases of emergence, development, and implementation or convergence, with different models of institu-tional change playing a dominant role in each period.
In the initial emergence phase, which corresponds to the institutional design perspective, actors signal their intention to address a social issue or develop a new practice, but they have not yet mobilized resources or organized sufficiently to frame the issues and introduce their proposals for change in the organizational field. As a result, organizational action is driven by technical considerations, and there is little interorganizational conflict. This is particularly true when the social issue or technical innovation is extremely novel or frame breaking and actors in the organizational field are unable to make sense of the issue. During this stage of institutional change, the antithesis has been mobilized, but insurgents have not yet summoned the strength to press it.
Collective action processes become more evident during the developmental phase of institutional change, when networks of actors emerge to introduce competing alternative approaches or designs that entail different proposals for institutional change. However, the efficacy of competing alternatives remains moderately ambiguous and questionable. Competing networks, each pursuing their material objectives, engage in political behavior to gain support and legitimacy from key constituencies for their own frames and proposals on the issue or technology in question. During this period, a pluralistic organizational field emerges as networks of partisan groups mobilize political campaigns to advance their cause and discredit competing alternatives. In this phase the signature of institutional change is no longer actors' identities and interests but, rather, the dynamics of collective action. The action shifts from the entity level to the field level. During this stage, thesis and antithesis have collided to produce a synthesis.
Finally, the adaptation and diffusion models may best explain the implementation or convergence phase of institutional change, once a particular institutional design has won the political campaign and has become legitimated and ratified. Thereafter, political behavior subsides, as the new institutional arrangements supporting the winning design are adopted and diffused, while the proposals and designs of the losing groups are silenced and submerged (at least temporarily) until the next opportunity arises to mobilize a campaign to replace or change the dominant institutional arrangements. The synthesis produced during the developmental phase has become a new thesis. Its antithesis lies dormant-not yet mobilized or theorized.
This conceptualization of institutional change as a progression through the models of institutional change is consistent with Fligstein's (1996 Fligstein's ( , 2001 ) three-stage model of market development. Just as we see contested collective action processes followed by a period of adaptation and diffusion, Fligstein sees market development as a period of contestation and exertion of power followed by a period of stability. We believe that the collective action model facilitates a clearer appreciation of the generative mechanism of change underlying Fligstein's model.
The view of institutional change presented here also is consistent with a punctuated equilibrium view of change (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . Based on the idea that, once institutionalized, beliefs and practices are taken for granted, experienced as objective reality, enduring, and reliably reproduced (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Bourdieu 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) , we could expect that cycles of institutional change would consist of long periods of incremental adaptation and diffusion of an institutional arrangement punctuated by relatively brief but revolutionary periods of institutional design and collective action. These revolutions would occur when the legitimacy of an institution was shattered because of a multiplicity of meanings, internal contradictions, inconsistency with other institutions, and other reasons (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Sewell, 1992) .
By framing institutional change as a dialectic, the collective action model clarifies that, even during the "convergence" periods between "reorientations" (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) , conflict and change are latent and, further, that the process of institutional change cycles endlessly between periods of convergence and divergence. New institutional settlements emerging from divergence episodes are both the synthesis of an existing dialectic and the thesis (soon to be challenged) of a new dialectic.
CONCLUSION
A collective action view of institutional change has emerged in both the TIM and SM literature. This view is characterized by its attention to struggles over the meanings of new issues and technologies and to the purposeful enactment of both the networks of actors that compose the organizational field and the institutional arrangements governing the organizational field. The generative mechanism of change underlying the collective action model is dialectics. According to the model, change is a field-level property that emerges from interactions among the members of the field.
Institutional scholars have begun to develop and mobilize this new view of institutional change, yet much theorizing remains to be done. In this paper we have tried to facilitate this future work by laying out the key features and assumptions of the model; by forging explicit links between the model and the better-known adaptation, diffusion, and design models of institutional change; and by calling attention to specific dimensions of collective action processes of change-conflict, power, and politics-that require further attention.
